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Abstract
We study monetary policy under dierent central bank constitutions when the
labor-market insiders set the nominal wage so that the outsiders are involuntarily
unemployed. If the insiders are in the majority, the representative insider will be
the median voter. We show that an independent central bank, if controlled by
the median voter, does not produce a systematic ination bias, albeit equilibrium
employment is too low from a social welfare point of view. A dependent central
bank, in contrast, is forced by the government to collect seigniorage and to take
the government's re-election prospects into account. The predictions of our theory
are consistent with the evidence that central bank independence decreases average
ination and ination variability, but does not aect employment variability.
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1 Introduction
Europe's nations have chosen a status of independence for the European Central Bank
on the conviction that independence is a necessary condition for avoiding an ination
bias in monetary policy. This conviction has been nourished by the unmatched stability
record of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Measured over the post-war period, German CPI
ination has been 2:8 percent on average, which is signicantly less than in the other
industrialized countries. Furthermore, as Blinder (1998) notes, post-war averages are
shaped by the extraordinary ination waves of the 1970s and early 1980s that were
unleashed by the Vietnam war, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and two
large oil price shocks. If the turbulent period 1970{82 is excluded, German ination
has been 2:0 percent on average. This favorable result can be equated with the virtual
absence of an ination bias given that for measurement reasons the true rate of price
level change is overestimated by the measured rate and that sucient nominal interest
rate variability requires a positive ination rate.
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In fact, the Bundesbank has been
led over decades by the notion that a measured rate of price level change of 2 percent
represents the desired state of price stability.
Surprisingly, there is no economic theory that can explain why the Bundesbank
has resisted the temptation of letting ination have its way. For example, Rogo (1985)
developed a model of an independent central bank where the bankers, who are more
conservative than the government, produce lower ination than the government, but
in that model the ination bias vanishes only in the extreme case that employment
stabilization is disregarded. Estimates of the Bundesbank's reaction function by Clarida
and Gertler (1997) conrm that the Bundesbank does stabilize the real economy.
2
Recent
alternative suggestions were to eliminate ination bias through an ination contract
[Walsh (1995)] or an ination target [Svensson (1997)]. This does not help to explain
1
For the US, Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and Jorgenson (1998) estimated that measured
CPI ination exceeds true CPI ination by 0:8-1:6 percentage points and Orphanides andWieland (1998)
showed that an ination target of 2 percent is required to ensure that the non-negativity constraint for
nominal interest rates is not binding in the conduct of stabilization policy.
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Taking the short-term interest rate as the policy instrument they nd a signicant response to
monthly observations of industrial production. Note that this signicance vanishes when annual data
is used and deviations of money growth from target are taken as the policy instrument; see Neumann
(1997).
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the Bundesbank's record either, because it has never worked under an ination contract
or an ination target.
The present paper develops a new model of central bank independence that can
explain the absence of an ination bias in Germany. The point of departure from the
literature is to call into question the standard assumption that the objective of monetary
policy is social welfare. Existing contributions typically assume, implicitly or explicitly,
that all individuals are identical. Under this assumption social welfare, dened in an
utilitarian way as the weighted sum of all individual utilities, equals the representative
agent's utility. Since, trivially, the representative agent is also the median voter, it is then
natural to assume that social welfare is the objective of monetary policy. A plausible
justication is that the government is elected by the median voter and that the central
bank's status of independence can survive only if it is backed by the median voter.
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Matters are completely dierent if, as in this paper, it is assumed that individuals are
not identical. In particular, the median voter's utility then diers from social welfare
and identifying the policy objective with social welfare has no descriptive content.
In order to make our point formally, we develop a simple model in the spirit of
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). In each sector of our economy, one trade union has
the monopoly power to set the nominal wage that is to be paid to all workers. Given
the standard assumption that unions care only about the well-being of their members,
the \insiders", they will reduce aggregate employment at the expense of the non-union
members, the \outsiders". The presence of monopoly unions is thus distortionary and
equilibrium employment is lower than is desirable from a social welfare point of view.
This implies that our model is capable of reproducing the familiar ination bias of
the Barro-Gordon analysis, provided that the monetary authority's objective function
is taken to be social welfare. However, for the reasons outlined above, we subscribe
to the positive view that the median voter's utility, instead of social welfare, counts.
In our model the median voter is an insider, because only if the monopoly unions are
backed by the majority of the population, they can survive, implying that the majority
of the population must be insiders. The key point to notice now is that the insiders are
3
The latter point can be illustrated by noting that, for example, a simple majority of the German
parliament can change the institutional status of the German Bundesbank.
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against the creation of surprise ination other than for the stabilization of unanticipated
productivity shocks. The reason is that since they are fully employed, a creation of
surprise ination aimed at increasing employment beyond the natural rate would hurt
them, as it drives them o their desired employment, lowers their real wage and leads
to costly ination.
Given that the independent central bank cares about the median voter, we derive
results that are in stark contrast to the literature. First, in our model equilibrium
ination no longer depends on the dierence between the natural rate level of employment
and the higher level that is desirable from a social welfare point of view. Instead, the
independent central bank provides zero ination on average. Second, the independent
central bank stabilizes employment optimally from the median voter's point of view as
well as from the social welfare point of view.
Though the median voter plays a decisive role in our analysis, she cannot avoid
an ination bias if the central bank is dependent. In this case a political business
cycle in ination arises as in Fratianni, von Hagen and Waller (1997) and Lohmann
(1995), stemming from the government's attempt to fool the median voter so as to
improve the re-election prospects. Moreover, the government may force the dependent
central bank to create more seigniorage than is optimal from the median voter's point
of view. This occurs because the government values revenues that can be collected
without eort on its part [Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1996)]. As a result, a principal-
agent problem emerges and the dependent central bank is found to create higher average
ination and a higher ination variability than the independent central banker, while
employment variability remains unaected. These predictions of our theory are in line
with the stylized facts of the large body of cross-country studies of the correlations
between the legal degree of central bank independence and the level and variability of
ination and employment; see e.g. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman
(1992), Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijnger, Schaling and Hoeberichts (1998).
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the labor market struc-
ture and the objective functions of dierent players; Section 3 provides the equilibrium
solutions when the central bank is independent and the policy objective is either social
3
welfare or the median voter's utility; in Section 4 we introduce rational retrospective
voting and show that the standard results obtain when the central bank is dependent;
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is similar to that used by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997). It has the
following actors: a government, a central banker and a large number of identical trade
unions and rms.
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In each sector of the economy, there is one rm, which sells its
product in a competitive market, and one trade union, which has monopoly power over
wage setting { a so-called monopoly union. The number of union members, the insiders,
is taken to be the same across sectors and is exogenously given.
5
We also assume that
the number of non-union members, the outsiders, is the same in each sector and denote
the share of insiders in the total labor force by s. Note that, otherwise, the outsiders
would have an incentive to migrate to sectors with relatively fewer outsiders, where job
prospects are more favorable for them, providing the number of insiders is the same
across sectors. Finally, we suppose that the monopoly unions set the nominal wage and
the rm determines employment.
The sequence of events in each period is as follows: (i) each trade union sets the
nominal wage, w
t
[if not mentioned explicitly, all variables are in logarithms]; (ii) a
productivity shock 
t
occurs and is observed only by the central bank; (iii) the central
banker chooses the price level, p
t
, the value of which is not observed by anyone else at the
time of action; (iv) a shock, 
t
, to the government's competence occurs, the realization
of which is observed only by the government; (v) the average per capita employment, l
t
,
is determined by rms labor demand and is observed by everybody [l
t
equals the log of
total employment in hours divided by the number of workers]; (vi) if the period is odd,
an election is held; (vii) the realizations of p
t
and 
t
are observed. With regards to the
elections, we assume that the simple majority of votes decides whether the incumbent is
4
Technically, we assume continua of measure 1 of identical trade unions and rms.
5
More general specications such as that of Blanchard and Summers (1986) determine union mem-
bership endogenously. We prefer not to do this, because it would introduce dynamic features into our
otherwise repeated game structure.
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re-elected or a randomly drawn challenger replaces her.
Given the nature of the nominal wage contracts, employment in each sector is
determined by the labor demand of this sector's rm. We assume that the economy-
wide average per capita employment depends on the real wage, the productivity shock,

t
, and the competence of the incumbent, 
t
:
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l
t
= (p
t
  w
t
) + 
t
+
t
; (1)

t
 
t

t 1
+ 
t
;

0
 0;

t

8
>
<
>
:
1; if the incumbent holds oce for the second period;
0; if the incumbent holds oce for the rst period:
As in Rogo and Sibert (1988), the innovation 
t
to the incumbent's level of competence
has a positive impact on aggregate employment. The two shocks 
t
and 
t
are taken
to have zero covariance and to be independently, identically, and uniformly distributed
with zero means and compact supports [ x

; x

] and [ x

; x

], 0 < x

; x

< 1. The
denition of 
t
captures the idea that competence shocks are incumbent specic. They
therefore carry over to the next period only if the incumbent remains in oce.
In order to distinguish the insiders from the outsiders, we make the key assump-
tion that the per capita employment of a representative insider is larger than that of a
representative outsider. In particular, we assume that rms nd it optimal to hire such
that the per capita employment of insiders and outsiders is given by L
k
t
= (1 + h
k
)L
t
,
where k 2 fi; og indicates whether the individual is an insider or an outsider, h
k
are
constants with h
o
=  sh
i
=(1   s), and L
t
is the average level of per capita employment
across all individuals. Assuming that h
i
is small, taking logs implies
l
k
t
= l
t
+ h
k
: (2)
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Note that since there is a continuum of measure one of identical sectors, the value of any economic
variable must be the same in each sector and on the aggregate. We therefore do not need to distinguish
between the two.
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Wage-setting is modelled by supposing that each trade union maximizes the ex-
pected utility of it's representative member.
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We assume that insiders and outsiders have
the same individual preferences, preferring a higher over a lower real wage and disliking
deviations of employment and of ination from the respective bliss points,

l and 0. In
particular, the present discounted utility as of period t is
U
k
(t) =
1
X
j=t

j t
U
k
j
=
1
X
j=t

j t
h
(w
j
  p
j
) 
a
2
(l
k
j
 

l)
2
 
b
2

2
j
i
; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor and a and b are positive constants. Ination is
dened as the rate of price change, i.e. 
j
 p
j
  p
j 1
. Using (2), it is straightforward
to rewrite (3) in terms of (the log of) average per capita employment:
U
k
(t) =
1
X
j=t

j t
h
(w
j
  p
j
) 
a
2
(l
j
 

l
k
)
2
 
b
2

2
j
i
; (4)
where

l
k


l h
k
denote the economy-wide average per capita employment levels [i.e. em-
ployment in hours divided by the total number of individuals in the work force] desired
by insiders and outsiders, respectively. Our assumptions imply that, ceteris paribus,
insiders prefer a lower level of average per capita employment than outsiders,

l
i
<

l <

l
o
.
Given the utility function (4), we can derive semi-reduced forms for the nominal
wage and for employment, still depending on the actual and the expected price level.
Maximizing the expectation of (4) subject to labor demand (1) while taking ination
expectations as given results in the following rst-order condition for a typical trade
union's choices of the nominal wage:
w
t+1
= p
e
t+1
  l
n
+ 
t+1

t
; (5)
where the natural rate of employment is dened as l
n


l
i
  1=a. Substituting (5) into
7
Although this assumption is not without problems, it is widely adopted; see Booth (1995) for a
discussion.
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(1) yields a semi-reduced form for employment:
l
t+1
= l
n
+ (p
t+1
  p
e
t+1
) + 
t+1
+ 
t+1
: (6)
We see that a positive competence shock in the current period implies that in the next
period workers can take home a higher real wage if the incumbent is still in charge,
without adverse consequences for employment. Thus, if the incumbent continues to be
in power, both the insiders' and the outsiders' utility in period t + 1 increases in the
realization of the government's competence shock in t.
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3 Monetary Policy Under Central Bank Indepen-
dence
In this section, we model monetary policy under an independent central bank. Necessary
and sucient conditions for central bank independence are institutional and personal in-
dependence from government [Neumann (1991)]. Institutional independence means that
the government cannot directly interfere with the implementation of monetary policy,
which requires that government representatives do not have a say on the central bank
board and that the central bank cannot be forced to nance government debt. Personal
independence from the government can be achieved through long-term appointments
and by prohibiting early removal from the oce and reappointment. Both institutional
and personal independence are granted by the laws of the more independent central
banks, such as the Swiss National Bank or the Bundesbank. In particular, the Bun-
desbank Law explicitly prohibits monetizing government debt and stipulates that the
ocial term length is eight years, which doubles due to the practice of unconditional
reappointment.
An independent central banker has no reason to please the government and can
therefore maximize its own objective function. To relate our framework to existing
work, we rst replicate the standard results of the literature, which typically assumes
8
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4), this can easily be shown formally as well.
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that independent central banks are concerned with some form of social welfare function.
3.1 The Standard Theory
The seminal contribution on the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central
bank is due to Rogo (1985), who build on Barro and Gordon (1983). These authors
had assumed that the government maximizes social welfare. Applying the standard
utilitarian notion that social welfare is the sum of all individual utilities, the government's
objective function in our setting becomes:
U
g
(t) =
1
X
j=t

j t
[sU
i
j
+ (1  s)U
o
j
]: (7)
Maximizing the expectation of (7) for given 
t
and p
e
t
and subject to (4), (5) and (6),
the rst-order condition of the government's problem is obtained:
0 =  a[p
t
  p
e
t
+ 
t
  (

l  

l
i
)]  b(p
t
  p
t 1
); (8)
where we have used the fact that (1   s)(

l
o
 

l
i
) = (

l  

l
i
). Taking the expectations
operator through this expression, a typical trade union's price expectation can be derived:
p
e
t
= p
t 1
+ (a=b)(

l 

l
i
). After substituting this back into (8) and using (5) and (1), we
nd the equilibrium solutions:
w
t
=
a
b
(

l  

l
i
)  l
n
+ 
t

t 1
; (9a)

t
=
a
b
(

l  

l
i
) 
a
a+ b

t
; (9b)
l
t
= l
n
+
b
a+ b

t
+ 
t
: (9c)
As in Barro and Gordon, equilibrium ination is found to exhibit a systematic ination
bias, (a=b)(

l  

l
i
), which is is proportional to the dierence between the \average" em-
ployment target,

l, and the insiders' lower employment target,

l
i
. To understand the
analytical form of this bias, note that a social planner (if she could set the nominal
wage and ination so as to maximize welfare) would target the weighted average of the
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natural rates preferred by the insiders and by the outsiders, i.e. s

l
i
+(1  s)

l
o
=

l  1=a,
instead of

l
i
 1=a. The existence of monopoly trade unions has the consequence that the
equilibrium real wage is too high and equilibrium employment is too low from a social
welfare point of view. Since the wage setters take into account that a benevolent central
banker tries to correct for this, the systematic ination bias in (9b) is proportional to
the discrepancy between the social planner's preferred natural rate and the prevailing
natural rate,

l  

l
i
.
Rogo (1985) pointed out that the ination bias can be reduced if an independent
central banker is appointed who puts a weight on ination that is higher than society's
weight. The cost of reducing ination bias comes from the fact that the conservative
central banker does not stabilize employment optimally. Rogo showed that there is
a nite degree of weight conservatism such that credibility and exibility are traded
o optimally. So, average ination under a conservative central banker is positive and
Rogo's model does not t the record of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which has virtu-
ally achieved price stability and, at the same time, stabilized the real economy. This
observation motivated our paper.
3.2 A New Theory
Here, we drop the assumption that an independent central bank is guided by an objective
function of the form (7). The key question then is which objective function an indepen-
dent central bank adopts. We argue that while independence means independence from
government, it does not mean the lack of constraints or outside control. The main point
to notice is that simple majorities of parliament can typically change the central bank
law, even for the relatively independent central banks, such as the Deutsche Bundesbank
or the Federal Reserve. This allows the median voter to threaten a \misbehaving" central
bank board with cuts in the bank's operating budget, changes in their term length, and
the introduction of more demanding reporting requirements. Since all of these measures
aect negatively the oce rent of the central bankers, the threat of using them should
impose serious constraints on how far the monetary policy stance can deviate from that
preferred by the median voter. Alt (1992) makes this point with respect to the US and
9
provides empirical evidence that one principal of the Federal Reserve is Congress; see also
Grier (1991). In Germany, similar forces are likely to be at work, as a simple majority
of the parliament can alter the Bundesbank law.
The above argument suggests that the median voter's preferences should play a
prominent role in an independent central bank's objective function. However, there
has been some discussion on whether the Deutsche Bundesbank nonetheless behaves in
partisan fashion. In particular, Vaubel (1997) suggested that the members of the Central
Bank Board attempt to support the government in pre-election periods if they share its
political aliation. However, Neumann (1998) and Berger and Woitek (1997) do not nd
statistically signicant evidence. Consequently, we neglect this possibility and assume
that the objective function of an independent central bank is given by
U
cb
(t) =
1
X
j=t

j t
(R
cb
+ U
i
t
); (10)
whereR
cb
denotes the banker's oce rent. Since, in OECD countries, the central bankers'
salaries are normally indexed to ex post ination and since the central bank cannot keep
the seigniorage it collects, R
cb
is a constant.
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Maximizing the expectation of (10) subject to (4), (5) and (6), and going through
the same analytical steps as before now yields the equilibrium outcome under central
bank independence:
w
t
=  l
n
+ 
t

t 1
; (11a)

t
=  
a
a+ b

t
; (11b)
l
t
= l
n
+
b
a+ b

t
+ 
t
: (11c)
These solutions drive home the key result of our analysis: the independent central bank
does not generate an ination bias. The reason is that the bank does not attempt to
systematically increase employment beyond the prevailing natural rate, because the trade
9
In Germany, for example, the salaries of members of the Central Bank Board are, like all salaries
of civil servants, adjusted to compensate for increases in the CPI.
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unions have already picked the levels of the real wage and of employment that are optimal
from the insiders' point of view. Any surprise ination, created to raise employment
systematically, would reduce the insiders' real wage rate in exchange for an undesired
increase in the economy-wide average of per-capita employment that does not benet
the insiders. The only type of surprise ination desired by insiders is the one directed at
dampening the impact of unanticipated productivity shocks. Solutions (11) indicate that
this stabilization task is optimally fullled from a representative insiders point of view.
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In sum, the charter of central bank independence provides precommitment. Since this
eliminates the inecient ination bias, it is of value to insiders as well as outsiders, and
therefore to society as a whole.
We conclude this section by pointing out that, in our model, the insiders do inict
involuntary unemployment upon the outsiders. To see this, consider the hypothetical
situation in which the latter can set the nominal wage. With central bank independence,
this would result in the following equilibrium outcomes:
w
t
=  

l
o
+
1
a
+ 
t

t 1
; (12a)

t
=  
a
a+ b

t
; (12b)
l
t
=

l
o
 
1
a
+
b
a+ b

t
+ 
t
: (12c)
Comparison of the solutions (11) and (12) shows that the outsiders prefer a reduction
in the wage in exchange for an increase in average per capita employment. Since the
nominal wage (11a) set by the insiders is higher than (12a), this must also mean that they
would want to work more than they do in (11c), that is, the outsiders are involuntarily
unemployed when the insiders set the nominal wage.
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Note that these results are similar to those of Fratianni et al. (1997). The main contribution of our
paper is to be seen in the explanation where the policy objective comes from and why an independent
central bank does not have an ambitious employment target.
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4 Monetary Policy Under Central Bank Dependence
Given that the median voter is crucial for our results, it may seem that a dependent
central bank, too, should provide zero average ination, as the government is elected by
the median voter. In this section, we demonstrate that this is not true. We argue that a
dependent central bank will be forced by the incumbent to pursue policies that are not
in the interest of the median voter.
4.1 The Government's Objective
As most of the literature, we equate the objective of a dependent central bank with that
of the government. The usual justication is that a dependent central bank is basically
a government agency. So, the question to answer here is what objective function the
government will follow. Since the government is elected by the median voter, we make
the common assumption that it cares about the median voter's utility. The literature on
political business cycles points out that, in addition, the government will be concerned
with the oce rent it is collecting; see for example Rogo and Sibert (1988). Since
the government has to stand regular elections, this introduces an incentive to pursue
opportunistic policies that are suboptimal from the median voter's point of view.
11
We assume a form of the government's utility function that captures both the
government's concern with the median voter's utility and with securing its oce rent,
R
g
j
:
U
g
(t) =
1
X
j=t

j t
(R
g
j
+ U
i
j
): (13a)
The oce rent takes the form
R
g
j
= r
g
+ c(p
j
  p
e
j
) + d(p
e
j
  p
j 1
); (13b)
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Note that Herrendorf and Neumann (1998) show that the multi-dimensionality of the voting deci-
sions in democratic election can be an additional reason why the elected government does not represent
the median voter with respect to monetary policy.
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where r
g
, c and d are positive constants. The constant term r
g
captures the part of
the incumbent's utility from holding oce that is independent of ination. This may
include the incumbent's salary (which in OECD countries is typically indexed to ex post
ination), fringe benets etc. As in de Kock and Grilli (1993), the other two terms
are linear approximations of the seigniorage that results from unexpected and expected
ination. Since the latter is smaller than the former, we have c > d; see Herrendorf
(1997) for further discussion.
The assumption that the incumbent's oce rent depends positively on seigniorage
can be motivated by public choice arguments. Niskanen (1971), for example, argued
convincingly that politicians tend to overspend, because they derive private benets
from controlling a large budget, directing a large bureaucracy and the like. Recently,
Persson et al. (1996) have taken the more cynical view that the incumbent government
can divert the more resources for its own use, the more resources it collects. Since
seigniorage is the only revenue source in our highly stylized model, these considerations
suggest that it ought to aect the incumbent's utility positively. Note that this argument
will be valid also in more complete models with alternative revenue sources. The reason
is that collecting seigniorage requires practically no eort on part of the government. In
contrast, the tax revenue can be increased only if the tax collection process is made more
ecient or if the average tax rate is increased. As the experience of various countries
suggests, this typically involves long and tedious processes of approval by parliament and
subsequent implementation; see Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) for further
discussion.
4.2 Equilibrium
We rst solve for the equilibrium in even periods, in which no election is held. Taking
p
e
t
as given, the government maximizes with respect to p
t
the expectation of (13a) con-
ditional on 
t
and subject to (4), (5) and (6). Following the same steps as above, one
13
nds for the equilibrium in a non-election period:
w
t
=
c
b
  l
n
+ 
t

t 1
; (14a)

t
=
c
b
 
a
a+ b

t
; (14b)
l
t
= l
n
+
b
a+ b

t
+ 
t
; t = 2; 4; 6 : : : : (14c)
Next, to solve for the equilibrium in an odd period when an election takes place,
we need to analyze rst the voting decisions of individuals. Since the competence shock

t
aects the individual utilities in period t + 1 if and only if the incumbent remains
in oce, it is optimal for all individuals to have 
t+1
= 1 [
t+1
= 0] if and only if 
t
is
larger [smaller] than zero. In other words, both insiders and outsiders wish to re-elect
the incumbent if and only if she experiences a positive competence shock in the election
period. In contrast, since the potential challengers of the incumbent do not have a draw
of 
t
, their expected competence for period t + 1 is zero and it is optimal to elect the
challenger whenever 
t
< 0.
The key assumption of rational retrospective voting models is that in an election
period t voters cannot observe 
t
but only l
t
  l
n
, which is the sum of p
t
  p
e
t
, 
t
and 
t
.
Since they wish to re-elect competent incumbents and replace incompetent ones, they
will form an optimal forecast of 
t
based on the observed realization of l
t
  l
n
. The
incumbent then has an incentive to fool the voters by creating surprise ination, because
the expansionary eect of surprise ination on employment cannot be distinguished
from that of a positive competence shock. To solve the model, we restrict attention to
Markov-perfect strategies. The state variable in period t is the realization of last period's
competence shock, 
t 1
. We postulate that in an odd period t individuals re-elect the
incumbent, if and only if l
t
  l
n
> 0. Together with the uniformity of the distribution of

t
, this implies the following re-election probability from the incumbent's point of view:
Prob( re-election j p
e
t
; 
t
) = Prob( 
t
> p
e
t
 p
t
 
t
j p
e
t
; 
t
) = max

0;
x

+ p
t
  p
e
t
+ 
t
2x


;
t = 1; 3; 5 : : : : (15)
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Given these expressions, we can solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game. It
will be shown below that, indeed, it is optimal for individuals to vote for the incumbent
if and only if l
t
  l
n
> 0.
The government's optimal ination choice in an election period can be found by
taking the rst derivative with respect to p
t
of the expectation of (13a) conditional on 
t
and subject to (4), (5), (6) and (15). Supposing that x

+ p
t
  p
e
t
+ 
t
 0, the rst-order
condition takes the form
0 = c  a(p
t
  p
e
t
+ 
t
)  b(p
t
  p
t 1
) +
(r
g
+ cd=b)
2x

: (16a)
(16a) implies that the rational price level expectation is:
p
e
t
= p
t 1
+
c
b
+
(r
g
+ cd=b)
2bx

: (16b)
Substituting (16b) into (16a) and using (5) and (6), the equilibrium in an election period
is obtained:
w
t
=
c
b
  l
n
+ 
t

t 1
+
(r
g
+ cd=b)
2bx

; (16c)

t
=
c
b
 
a
a+ b

t
+
(r
g
+ cd=b)
2bx

; (16d)
l
t
= l
n
+
b
a+ b

t
+ 
t
; t = 1; 3; 5 : : : : (16e)
We have made two assumptions to arrive at these solutions. The rst one was that
individuals vote for the incumbent if and only if l
t
  l
n
> 0. This can now be justied
by noting that from (16e)
E(
t
jl
t
) =

2


2

b
2
=(a+ b)
2
+ 
2

(l
t
  l
n
);
implying that E(
t
jl
t
) is positive if and only if l
t
  l
n
is positive. Since voters wish to
re-elect the incumbent only if 
t
> 0, the postulated voting rule is indeed optimal. Our
second assumption was that x

+ p
t
  p
e
t
+ 
t
 0. A sucient condition for this to be
the case in equilibrium is x

 x

. Since we are not interested in cases, in which the
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Table 1: Predictions of our Theory
Dependence Independence
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g
+ cd=b)
4bx

0

2
l
= E(^
2
l
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2
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
2
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+

2
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2
16b
2
x
2

a
2
(a+ b)
2

2

incumbent has no chance on the margin to improve her re-election prospects through
the creation of unexpected ination, we assume that this condition holds.
Comparing (14b) and (16d) shows that a dependent central bank creates an in-
ation bias c=b in all periods. Furthermore, in election periods, an additional bias
(r
g
+ cd=b)=(2bx

) arises. The biases are due to the principal-agent problem that stems
from the incumbent'smotive to collect seigniorage and to win elections. The trade unions
understand these incentives and set higher nominal wages. Consequently, voters are not
fooled in equilibrium and employment remains unaected. In other words, our model
predicts a political business cycle in ination but not in employment.
Our theory also predicts that the variances of ination and employment are unre-
lated to the status of the central bank; see Table 1 for the analytical details. As regards
the variance of employment this is consistent with the cumulative empirical evidence; see
e.g. Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijnger
et al. (1998). The prediction of an unaected ination variance, in contrast, may seem
to contradict the facts. However, this must not be the case, as the standard estimate
^
2

= (1=T )
P
T
t=1
(
t
  )
2
is biased when the expectation of ination varies over time, as
it does in our model when the central bank is dependent. Indeed, in contrast to the true
variance, the estimated ination variability is negatively related to the degree of central
bank independence in our model. We may therefore conclude that our non-normative
theory does not contradict the evidence. Note that this is not the case for Rogo's
16
theory, which predicts that an independent central bank stabilizes less and therefore
increases employment variability.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has departed from the observation that we lack a theory of central bank
independence that can explain the stability record of the Bundesbank. Time-consistent
monetary policy yields excessive ination even in the model of Rogo (1985) where
the government appoints independent central bankers who are more conservative. We
have presented a new theory. The key assumption is that the independent central bank
maximizes the welfare of the median voter instead of social welfare. As a result, and
in contrast to the standard theory, an independent central banker stabilizes the real
economy and, nevertheless, provides zero ination on average. The reason for this is
that our central banker is independent from the government but not from the median
voter. The dependent central banker, in contrast, cares about the government's desire
to collect seigniorage and to improve the re-election chances. Consequently, an ination
bias cannot be avoided.
The assumption that independent central bankers take the median voter's utility
as the policy objective is realistic because the median voter can change the central bank
law. Note as a further implication of our theory that central bank independence will
be the outcome if the government should put up a referendum on the constitution of
the central bank. However, the government of our model may not wish to propose
such a referendum because with central bank independence it would loose the grip on
seigniorage. Finally, it goes without saying that all results depend on which characteristic
of the median voter is made the focal point. We have put the focus on the characteristic
of being an insider in the labor market who sets an excessively high wage level and forces
involuntary unemployment upon the outsiders. Alternatively, the median voter might
be a net creditor; see for example Faust (1996). We leave it to future research to explore
what dierent implications that may have for monetary policy under dierent central
bank constitutions.
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